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Whatever else it achieved in its first months in office, the Clinton Administra-
tion made U.S. citizens more aware of the White House Counsel's Office. The
Counsel's Office was at the center of the brief uproar that arose when the press
discovered that presidential aides had manipulated the FBI to put White House
patronage maneuvers (replacing career officials in the White House travel office
with friends or relatives of President Clinton) in a better light.1 The apparent
suicide of the Deputy Counsel, Vincent Foster, amidst mysterious circumstances,
focused new attention on the Counsel's Office, all the more so as the Counsel's
Office was accused of mismanaging and manipulating the investigation of
Foster's death in peculiar ways.2 Counsel Bernard Nussbaum ultimately
achieved the distinction of being the first White House Counsel whose activities
were visible enough-and controversial enough-for respectable editorialists to
condemn his personal performance and demand his removal from the office.3
If the Counsel's Office achieved more notoriety in the Clinton Administra-
tion, its operations did not become easier to follow. But the role of the Counsel
has never been easy to define or to assess. The White House Counsel is often
described as "the President's lawyer." By constitutional tradition and statutory
provision, however, the president already has an official lawyer: the Attorney
General of the United States. The Attorney General has had a place in the
president's Cabinet-and an official role in providing legal advice to executive
officials-from the time of President Washington. The Counsel is an innovation
of recent decades. The Attorney General (along with other top officers in the
Justice Department) must be confirmed by the Senate and remain available for
frequent congressional appearances, while the Counsel and his aides are
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appointed at the sole discretion of the president and (protected by claims of
executive privilege) are never called to account by congressional committees.
The Attorney General has an array of formal duties and responsibilities, assigned
by statute and reflected in a continual flow of rulings, briefs, and other public
documents bearing the Attorney General's name or that of accountable
subordinates. The White House Counsel has no statutory duties-no statute
even acknowledges the existence of the Office-and the Counsel produces almost
no public documents under his own name. Whereas the Attorney General can
draw on the accumulated expertise and the vast resources of the Department of
Justice, the White House Counsel has barely a dozen aides in the White House.
The White House Counsel is, in effect, a rival source of legal advice for the
president, but one who necessarily operates in the shadows. The only real
advantage of the Counsel, compared with the Attorney General, is that the
Counsel is closer to the president-more fully dependent on the president's
favor, so situated that he can devote himself more single-mindedly to the
president's concerns, literally an "in-house counsel" in the same White House
office complex. No president will want to dramatize the fact that he relies more
on his in-house counsel than on the far more publicly accountable and better
equipped officers of the Justice Department. The Counsel's Office leaves very
few finger prints on presidential decisions. The Counsel's Office not only
produces very few public records but regards all its communications with the
president as shielded by attorney-client privilege and by a perhaps more
encompassing executive privilege. So precise details of the Counsel's actions or
advice are scarce.4 The unofficial character of the office, moreover, allows each
president to adjust the role of the Counsel, like that of other White House staff
functions, to his own individual preferences and requirements. And the role
clearly does vary from one administration to the next. Whereas Clinton Counsel
Nussbaum reports seeing the president several times a day,' his predecessor,
Bush Counsel C. Boyden Gray, claims rarely to have seen President Bush more
than once a week.6
At least a few things are clear about the Counsel's Office, however. First,
despite its lack of direct statutory grounding, the Counsel's Office has become
securely institutionalized in the structure of the White House. Institutional
forces, which are grounded in statutory imperatives, guarantee that modern
presidents will need access to an immediate staff of legal advisers in the White
House. Second, with this staff in place, whatever its routine duties, it is also
4. Scholars searching through presidential libraries have occasionally uncovered suggestive
memoranda giving some sense of the Counsel's role in particular disputes. But even this sort of detailed
research can reach only part of the story, since much business is now conducted by telephone-in part
for the very purpose of avoiding a permanent record of the deliberations involved.
5. David Margolick, An All-Star New York Lawyer Disputes the Idea He's Become a White House
Bumbler, N.Y. TIMEs, June 11, 1993, at A26.
6. Interview with C. Boyden Gray (May 12, 1993). Gray, currently a law partner in Washington
at the same firm as former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler, reports that Cutler claims to have been
"in and out of the Oval Office every day" when serving President Carter.
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available to help the president stay abreast of constitutional issues of particular
concern to him. Third, by freeing the president from total dependence on the
Attorney General and the Justice Department, the Counsel's Office can help
presidents to resist the inertial tendencies of the Justice Department-or to
counteract the political and institutional pressures that are most powerful in the
Justice Department. Put more succinctly, the existence of the White House
Counsel allows the president to play a more independent role in constitutional
disputes. In ways that may never be fully known, that is sure to be important.
II
ORIGINS AND GROWTH OF THE COUNSEL'S OFFICE
At first glance, there was nothing inevitable about the development of the
Counsel's Office. For most of U.S. history, presidents did not have a separate
legal counsel in the White House. The Canadian Prime Minister, who has
developed a large staff comparable in many ways to the White House staff, still
does not have a counterpart to the Counsel.7 Nor was the development of the
Counsel's Office an immediate outgrowth of the "modem presidency."
Most scholarship on the presidency traces the origins of the White House
staff to the Reorganization Act of 1939.' That measure in turn is usually
regarded as the ultimate legislative response to the Report of the Committee on
Administrative Management (the so-called Brownlow Report) with its famous
admonition, "The President needs help."9 Neither the Reorganization Act nor
the Brownlow Report-for all their emphasis on the president's need for staff
assistance in the White House-made any mention of a need for a separate legal
adviser in the White House. And the initial White House staff, assembled under
the authority of the Reorganization Act, did not, in fact, include a legal
officer."
The Counsel's Office arose out of personal, rather than institutional, needs.
The first person to be designated as a legal adviser on the White House staff was
Judge Samuel Rosenman of New York. Rosenman had been a close personal
adviser during Franklin Roosevelt's term as Governor of New York, a status
acknowledged in Albany with the title of "Counsel to the Governor."
Appointed by Roosevelt to New York's highest court in 1932, Rosenman
7. In 1990, the Canadian Prime Minister had a staff of 107 assistants. James Simeon, Prime
Minister's Office and White House Office: Political Administration in Canada and the United States, 21
PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES Q. 559, 568 (1991).
8. Ch. 36, 53 Stat. 561 (1939). Section 301 authorizes the presidential appointment of "not to
exceed six administrative assistants."
9. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, REPORT WITH SPECIAL
STUDIES 6 (1937). A fiftieth anniversary retrospective on the Brownlow Report used this line as its
summary title: FREDERICK MOSHER, THE PRESIDENT NEEDS HELP (1988).
10. In the U.S. Government Organization Manual for 1940, three people are described as "secretary
to the President" and another three as "Administrative Assistant," but beyond these only a "personal
secretary" and an "executive clerk" are mentioned in the listing of the "White House staff." See U.S.
GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUAL (1940).
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continued to offer informal advice to FDR and was finally persuaded to resign
from the bench and take up a full-time, official position at the White House in
1941."
In Washington, Rosenman was given the title of "Special Counsel to the
President," which seemed to imply something provisional, anomalous, or
tentative about the Counsel's status. Clark Clifford, who was trained by
Rosenman to succeed him as "Special Counsel," claims that President Roosevelt
actually had intended to offer Rosenman the more confident or general title of
"Counsel to the President." But "at the last minute," according to Clifford,
Attorney General Francis Biddle successfully prevailed on Roosevelt to abandon
that "simple and elegant title.., on the grounds that such a title would undercut
the role of the Attorney General as the President's chief legal adviser."' 2
In fact, Rosenman was much more than a legal adviser, which meant that in
practice he was much less than a formal counselor on issues of law. Rosenman
had no staff of his own and was not equipped to undertake extensive legal
research. He spent most of his time working on public statements for the
President-messages to Congress and political speeches. He did not vet them
for legal problems: he was himself the principal speech writer. In a very small
White House staff, he seems to have done a bit of everything. According to
Clifford, Rosenman's activities were so various and his methods so informal, that
no one thought it odd when Rosenman recruited Clifford, then a young naval
aide (still in uniform), to assist him with his work. 3
Rosenman set the pattern for the next quarter-century. Clark Clifford was
involved in a vast range of political issues in the Truman White House, with little
pretense that his contributions in most instances were specifically "legal."' 4
Like Rosenman, Clifford was one of a small circle of close advisers, whose
11. For an overview of Rosenman's career, see SAMUEL B. HAND, COUNSEL AND ADVICE: A
POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN (1979).
12. See CLARK CLIFFORD & RICHARD HOLBROOKE, COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT, A MEMOIR
54 (1991). Clifford presumably heard the story directly from Rosenman. It is told with more piquant
detail in DANIEL MEADOR, THE PRESIDENT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE 130 (1980), which reports that Attorney General Biddle told Roosevelt that "under the
Constitution" the authority to advise the president on legal affairs had to be vested in the Attorney
General and FDR then made a point of not announcing Rosenman's appointment until Biddle had left
for a trip to Mexico.
13. "Rosenman worked without any aides, simply reaching out to anyone he thought could be of
help .... [S]o informal and small was the White House in those days that neither of us saw anything
odd in the fact that upon leaving [Washington to assist President Truman at the Potsdam Conference
in Germany], the President's Special Counsel left a temporary Assistant Naval Aide with responsibility
for continuing research and drafting of a message on Universal Military Training .... " CLIFFORD &
HOLBROOKE, supra note 12, at 55-56.
14. "To the inevitable question What did a Special Counsel do?, the simplest and most accurate
answer was: Whatever the President wanted. The title of Special Counsel was grant [sic], but the job
had no power or authority other than that conferred by the President... . [M]y value was as an adviser
or counselor, and not as an administrator or bureaucrat." Id. at 75. It is revealing that George Elsey,
who was officially Clifford's "sole assistant" in the White House, id. at 6, a person Clifford describes as
"my closest associate and collaborator," id. at 51, and the person Clifford therefore "would very much
like to have recommended" to succeed him as Special Counsel was not a lawyer at all: this was,
however, regarded as disqualification for service as "Special Counsel," id. at 259.
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responsibilities also happened to include a few special legal chores. Clifford was
involved in everything from campaign strategy in the 1948 election to disputes
with the State Department about U.S. policy toward the emergence of a Jewish
state in the Mideast.
15
Throughout the 1960s, memoirs suggest a similar degree of informality and
open-ended activity for the White House staffer designated as "special counsel."
Theodore Sorensen, who served President Kennedy with this title, had been
Kennedy's principal aide during Kennedy's service in the Senate. In the White
House, Sorensen continued to act as principal speech writer and close adviser on
a broad range of matters, including responses to the Cuban Missile crisis.
16
Harry McPherson, who held the title of "special counsel" under President
Lyndon Johnson, developed a comparably broad array of White House
responsibilities, becoming actively involved, for example, in White House
deliberations about the bombing of North Vietnam. 7 Both Sorensen and
McPherson were subsequently invited to appear at a conference of presidential
"chiefs of staff." No one held that title in the Kennedy and Johnson Administra-
tions, but these "special counsels" were as close to that general, coordinating role
as any presidential aides in their periods of service in the White House."8
The great variation in titles illustrates the improvised nature of the Counsel's
role during the 1960s. Lyndon Johnson actually bestowed the "simple elegant
title" of "Counsel to the President" on Myer Feldman, who, as Sorenson's
assistant in the Kennedy White House, had carried the title of "Deputy Special
Counsel." A year later, another of Sorensen's assistants replaced Feldman but
under the old title of "Special Counsel," which remained Harry McPherson's title
15. Clifford's participation in White House deliberations on Palestine provoked resistance and
resentment from the Secretary of State. Clifford's role was resented, however, not for intruding "legal"
issues into foreign policy, but-revealingly-because he was regarded as introducing "political"
considerations into this field. Secretary of State Marshall protested to President Truman, "I fear that
the only reason Clifford is here [in a meeting with the President to discuss the issue] is that he is
pressing a political consideration with regard to this issue. I don't think politics should play any part in
this." Id. at 12.
16. For example, Arthur Schlesinger's memoir of the Kennedy Administration offers nearly a page
for each day to describe the inner history of the Kennedy White House: Sorensen is one of the central
figures in the tale, but is never described offering legal advice. ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, A THOUSAND
DAYS, JOHN F. KENNEDY IN THE WHITE HOUSE 960 (1965).
17. Lyndon Johnson mentions McPherson's involvement in deliberations on the proposed halt to
bombing in Vietnam in order to encourage North Vietnam to negotiate peace. LYNDON B. JOHNSON,
THE VANTAGE POINT, PERSPECTIVES OF THE PRESIDENCY 410, 418-19, 540 (1971). Johnson refers to
McPherson simply as "one of my assistants," id. at 410, without acknowledging any particular functions
as legal counsel. McPherson's own memoir devotes some 200 pages to his service in the White House,
HARRY MCPHERSON, A POLITICAL EDUCATION 245-455 (1972), but only a dozen pages (273-85) to
matters specifically pertaining to his role as "counsel" (and almost all of that discussion focuses on
responses to legislation). Starting with legal duties as an "understudy" to Special Counsel Lee White,
McPherson reports that "[m]onths passed before [he] felt fully employed at the White House." Id. at
250.
18. The conference is summarized in Samuel Kernell, The Creed and Reality of Modem White
House Management, in CHIEF OF STAFF. TwENTY-FIVE YEARS OF MANAGING THE PRESIDENCY 193-222
(Samuel Kernell & Samuel Popkin eds., 1986).
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over the next three years.19 The Nixon White House similarly began by
conferring the title "Counsel to the President" on top aide John Ehrlichman,
then retired the title again and gave the title of "Special Counsel" to three
separate political advisers simultaneously.20
The modem form of the Counsel's Office-and certainly the modem
nomenclature-seems to have settled into place with the appointment of John
Dean as "Counsel to the President" in 1971. Dean, whose title has been
continued ever since, was the first "Counsel" (or "Special Counsel" for that
matter) who was appointed without any previous personal connection to the
President. By Dean's account, he began his service as Counsel as a marginal
figure with no assistants. He saw the President no more than once every few
weeks and then mostly in connection with ceremonial occasions. 2 Dean was
the first "Counsel" (or "Special Counsel") whose duties were primarily a matter
of lawyering. He was also the first counsel to seek out new responsibilities in a
specifically legal vein-because he did not have much else to do. And his efforts
at "empire building" succeeded. Dean began the process of expanding the
specifically legal capacities of the Office of Counsel, so that the phrase came to
be associated not with the honorific title of one adviser but with an entire
separate bureaucracy. Dean soon secured a full-time assistant, then hired two
additional lawyers and a full-time detective for the Counsel's Office.22
Not all of John Dean's successors, to be sure, have started out as marginal
figures. Dean's sensational role, first in the coverup of the Watergate scandals,
then in their exposure to Congress and to independent prosecutors, seems to
have provided a lesson for later presidents. Since then presidents have sought
better known or more trusted figures. The Counsel's precise role has varied
from one administration to the next, however, depending on the degree of
19. See the entries for "The White House" in U.S. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUAL,
1963-1964, 1964-1965 and following years. McPherson's memoir, supra note 17, speaks of Meyer
Feldman and Lee White (who succeeded Feldman) as his own predecessors, without making anything
of the change in titles: "Mike Feldman, one of the last of the Kennedy staff, would soon be leaving.
His successor as special counsel [sic] was to be Lee White. The President wanted to know if I would like
to understudy Lee, who would be moving on himself." MCPHERSON, supra note 17, at 235. And again:
"The President needed a Special Counsel. Clark Clifford ... had held the job in Truman's day,
Sorensen and Mike Feldman in Kennedy's, Lee White and then I in Johnson's." Id. at 273.
20. Conferring the same title on three separate individuals suggests by itself that the title was
something of an honorific. In fact, the three advisers (Murray Chotiner, Charles Colson, and Harry
Dent) were preoccupied with party politics and not involved in legal or policy issues. Colson and Dent
continued to maintain the title of "Special Counsel" without in any way reporting to "Counsel" John
Dean or assisting Dean in his own work.
21. JOHN DEAN, BLIND AMBITION 5, 10 (1976). In fact, Dean reports that he had met neither the
President nor the President's Chief of Staff (Haldeman) before being selected for the Counsel's job on
the recommendation of Attorney General Mitchell. Id. By contrast, when Nixon wanted to reconsider
his administration's policy toward school desegregation-which required a careful consideration of how
much leeway statutes and court decisions on the issue actually left to the Justice Department and the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare-he turned not to Dean but to White House Counselor
Leonard Garment, who was, to be sure, an attorney, but had no precise law-related duties in the White
House. This episode is described in instructive detail in BRADLEY PATTERSON, JR., THE RING OF
POWER, THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF AND ITS EXPANDING ROLE IN GOVERNMENT 40-43 (1988).
22. DEAN, supra note 21, at 28, 30.
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intimacy and trust between Counsel and president. President Ford chose as
Counsel one of his oldest friends and professional associates, Phillip Buchen, a
figure who seems to have been important in a close-knit White House.'
President Carter followed a similar initial impulse in appointing his campaign
counsel and fellow Georgian, Robert Lipshutz, to be his White House Counsel;
but Lipshutz, lacking previous Washington experience, apparently played a
peripheral role in actual White House policy deliberations.24 When Carter
replaced Lipshutz with Lloyd Cutler, a very prominent and highly experienced
Washington lawyer, the change implied a readiness to see the Counsel assume
a much larger role.2 Cutler certainly took his appointment in this spirit and
quickly involved himself in an extraordinary range of administration affairs,
sitting in on National Security Council meetings, taking part in delicate missions
involving the Shah of Iran and the selling of the Strategic Arms Treaty to the
Soviet Union.26
None of the attorneys who served Ronald Reagan as Counsel brought as
much stature to the post or achieved so much prominence in it. Fred Fielding,
Counsel in Reagan's first term, had learned the job in serving as assistant to John
Dean in the Nixon Administration. He remained distinctly subordinate to James
Baker, the White House Chief of Staff in Reagan's first administration.27 When
Treasury Secretary Donald Regan became White House Chief of Staff at the
outset of Reagan's second term, Regan brought along to the White House one
23. See GERALD FORD, A TIME TO HEAL (1979), in which Ford relates the long personal
association between Ford and Buchen. Ford and Buchen had been fraternity brothers in college and
when they finished legal training, the two went into private practice together as "Ford and Buchen."
Id at 57. It was Buchen who urged Ford to make his first run for Congress in 1948, id. at 64, Buchen
who coached Ford for his confirmation proceedings as Vice-President, id. at 109, and Buchen who took
the initiative in organizing a transition staff when it began to appear that President Nixon would have
to resign his office to then Vice-President Ford, id. at 23-24. The two were so close that Ford discussed
his initial run for Congress with Buchen before even discussing it with his wife, id. at 64, and Buchen
took the initiative in planning for Ford's transition to the presidency without notifying President Nixon
or Ford, himself, id. at 24.
24. See COLIN CAMPBELL, MANAGING THE PRESIDENCY, CARTER, REAGAN AND THE SEARCH FOR
EXECUTIVE HARMONY 88 (1986) ("Lipshutz failed to become a major official in the administration.").
Carter's Attorney General, Griffin Bell, described Lipshutz as a "relatively unassertive, retiring lawyer"
and "not a combative, overly assertive individual." GRIFFIN BELL & RONALD J. OSTROw, TAKING
CARE OF THE LAW 37, 40 (1982).
25. CAMPBELL, supra note 24, at 88, connects the Cutler appointment with a larger effort in the
summer of 1979 "to add prestige to a flagging White House."
26. JIMMY CARTER, KEEPING FArTH, MEMOIRS OF A PRESIDENT 5-8 (1982) (Cutler's involvement
with negotiations on Iranian hostage crisis); id. at 518 (military rescue mission to Iran); id. at 468-69
(moving the Shah of Iran to new refuges); id. at 526 (boycott of Moscow Olympics). Cutler himself
alludes to the wide range of his activities in Lloyd Cutler, The Role of the Counsel to the President of the
United States, 35 RECORD, BAR ASS'N CITY OF N.Y. 470 (1980).
27. This was not simply a reflection of Baker's formal status at Chief of Staff. Reagan, though more
willing to delegate details to subordinates than most modern presidents, did not in his first term allow
everything to be channeled through a single staff director. In Reagan's first term, presidential counselors
Edwin Meese and Michael Deaver were regarded as constituting, with Baker, a "triumvirate" of equals
within the White House, which was transformed into the "Big Four" with the addition of Judge William
Clark as National Security Advisor after 1982. Fielding was an aide to Baker (occasionally assisting
Meese), but never a contender for a place in the top circle of aides. CAMPBELL, supra note 24, at 94.
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of his top aides, Peter Wallison, to serve as counsel.2  Barely a year later,
amidst recriminations over the emerging Iran-Contra scandal, Regan was
replaced as Chief of Staff by former senator Howard Baker. Baker replaced
Wallison with one of his own close associates, A.B. Culvahouse. Culvahouse,
who had served as legislative aid to Baker in the Senate and on Baker's
retirement from the Senate, had moved with him to a Washington law firm. But
in an Administration that had already lost most of its policy momentum and was
preoccupied with the destabilizing effects of scandal, Culvahouse was not
associated with major policy initiatives.29 Gray's family background was similar
to Bush's and the families were socially connected in the 1950s.' More
importantly, in the Reagan years, Gray had served for eight years as Counsel to
Vice-President Bush and the two had developed an unusually close and trusting
professional relationship in that period. Gray thus took a prominent role in
Bush Administration deliberations over the shape of new Clean Air Act
amendments, over the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the 1991 Civil Rights
Act."
Even prominent Counsels like Lloyd Cutler or Boyden Gray did not achieve
the dominant staff position of Clark Clifford or Theodore Sorenson, however.
Carter's Chief of Staff, Hamilton Jordan, who had masterminded Carter's
election in 1976, remained the President's most trusted aide; Cutler was an
outsider "with special experience," as Carter put it. 2 Boyden Gray, for all his
close ties to President Bush, was publicly scolded by Bush Chief of Staff John
Sununu when Gray protested the legal form of a major "deal" between the Bush
Administration and congressional leaders on aid to the Nicaraguan contras.33
Subsequently, Gray's effort to draft an executive order to federal agencies on
proper compliance with the new Civil Rights Act was abruptly repudiated by the
White House.' With all his extra ventures, Gray was, like his immediate
predecessors, the Counsel, not the Chief of Staff or the chief domestic policy
adviser. Gray, himself, explained to journalists that it was not his place as
Counsel to handle political issues, but simply to handle background legal
issues.31
28. Eric Effron, Culvahouse Assumes Key White House Legal Post, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 9, 1987, p.
1, offers a brief sketch of Wallison's service, on the occasion of his departure.
29. Vicki Quade, The President Is His Only Client, 15 THE BARRISTER, Winter/Spring 1988, at 5-6
(interview with A.B. Culvahouse, Jr., 1988).
30. As a Washington columnist summed it up, "Bush's father played golf with Gray's father." Mary
McGrory, Gray's Finger Pointing Counsel, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 1989, at A2.
31. For an overview of Gray's work with Bush during the Reagan Administration, see Philip Combs,
The Distant Drum of C. Boyden Gray, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 1989, at Dl.
32. CARTER, supra note 26, at 61.
33. David Hoffman, Sununu Rebukes Counsel, Chief of Staff Angry at Gray's Challenge to Contra
Aid Deal, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 1989, at Al.
34. Andrew Rosenthal, President Tries to Quell Furor on Interpreting Scope of New Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 22, 1991, at Al.
35. As Counsel, Gray was responsible for reviewing FBI background reports and other documents
pertaining to presidential nominations. Thus, when John Tower, President Bush's initial nominee for
Secretary of Defense, was rejected by the Senate amidst reports of his record of heavy drinking and
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Compared with the status of the position before the Nixon years, the
Counsel's Office-whatever the profile of the individual Counsel-was a more
secure base. Although men such as Clifford or Sorensen may have acquired
several specialized duties with the title "Special Counsel," they did not acquire
and do not seem to have needed a separate legal staff Recent Counsels,
whether they played a larger role or not, have had their own staff and their own
institutional niche.
The Counsel's Office has grown steadily. In 1980, Lloyd Cutler recruited a
staff of six lawyers to assist him.36 By 1986, Fred Fielding reported a staff of
eight to ten lawyers. 37 By 1987, the number had grown to fourteen lawyers and
stayed in that range during the Bush Administration.3  The Clinton White
House started out with a staff of thirteen lawyers-and had appointed a Deputy
Counsel and a brace of "Associate Counsels" and "Assistant Counsels" weeks
before any formal nominations to the Justice Department.39 So well-developed
and extensive are the distinctive legal duties of the Counsel, they can no longer
be tacked onto the responsibilities of the chief of staff or a principal domestic
policy adviser. The Counsel's Office is now preeminently an office of lawyers,
doing lawyers' work.
Why does the contemporary White House need to have its own special legal
staff? Why have successive administrations found it necessary to maintain and
expand this staff over the past two decades? Several factors seem to be
important. Each relates to a larger dimension of the pressures on the contempo-
rary presidency.
"womanizing," there were complaints that Gray had "focused too narrowly on whether Tower was guilty
of serious wrong-doing rather than considering whether Senate Democrats could mount a political
offensive." Defending his performance, Gray explained, "I wasn't the political manager! ... My role
was not to make political judgments about it. I had nothing to do with the selection of Tower to begin
with." Combs, supra note 31, at D8.
36. Cutler, supra note 26, at 470-80.
37. David 0. Stewart, The President's Lawyer, A.B.A. J. Apr. 1, 1986 at 59.
38. Quade, supra note 29, at 6.
39. The "Federal Yellow Book" for Winter 1993 (dated January 20, 1993), lists a Counsel, Deputy
Counsel and two Associate Counsels. White House aides confirmed that the total number of lawyers
working in the Counsel's Office was 13 by early February. (Official listings of the White House staff
never give the full number of lawyers because extra lawyers are usually "detailed" from departments to
circumvent congressional restrictions or concerns about excessive size of the fulltime staff.) Walter
Dellinger, then serving in the Counsel's Office, suggested in a telephone interview that positions in the
Counsel's Office were more easily filled than those in the Justice Department because the latter require
Senate confirmation and it would be imprudent to advance any other Justice Department nominations
before an Attorney General had been confirmed, lest this complicate the AG's own confirmation. It is
still notable that Clinton's Counsel, Bernard Nussbaum, was described in the official staff listing not only
as "Counsel" but also as "Assistant to the President"-an additional honorific not even given to Boyden
Gray.
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III
THE FORCE OF ETHICS
Issues dealing with "ethics" have been central to the expansion of the White
House Counsel's Office. In 1970, John Dean's effort to expand his power base
in the Nixon White House focused on providing advice about conflicts of
interest. Dean's memoir of his White House service describes his strategy for
building up the Counsel's Office in these terms:
Our conflict of interest duties were the key .... The work was complicated and
boring, but I had already sensed that it would produce new business. If we were
alert in conflict-of-interest reviews and investigations, we would have a small say
in Presidential appointments. As with any law firm, our influence depended
largely on our reputation and our reputation was good. We cultivated it with
care.
40
As it turned out, Dean was in a growth "business." The first treatise-length
study of federal conflict of interest requirements had been published only a few
years before. t President Johnson had then issued to executive personnel the
first systematic executive order on rules for avoiding conflicts of interest.'
There were continuing questions, often raised by lawyers in other parts of the
government.43 The Counsel's advice could sometimes be disregarded and many
legal improprieties-and some outright crimes-were apparently undertaken
without consulting the Counsel. Still, requests for legal advice multiplied, and
within a year the three lawyers on Dean's staff "were hopelessly overworked." 44
The Nixon White House could still twitch at the recollection of black-eyes
sustained by earlier administrations over petty corruption scandals. Subsequent
administrations must have trembled when recollecting that the Watergate scandal
had ultimately devoured the entire Nixon Administration. President Ford faced
an embarrassing (and agonizingly slow) independent counsel investigation of his
own past actions, during his 1976 reelection campaign. 45 The Carter Adminis-
40. DEAN, supra note 21, at 29.
41. NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND FEDERAL SERVICE (Special
Committee on Federal Conflict of Interest, 1960); BAYLESS MANNING, FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST
(1961).
42. Executive Order 11222 (1965), 3 C.F.R. 306 (1964-65), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. 201 (1988).
43. Dean describes, for example, the case of a White House staff mission to Vietnam that returned
with Chinese rifles as souvenirs. Treasury Department officials sought to classify the rifles as "illegally
imported," and Dean then managed to save these souvenir rifles by discovering an obscure statutory
basis to classify them as legal "war trophies." DEAN, supra note 21, at 29.
44. Id.
45. The investigation focused on Ford's conduct as House Minority Leader, some years earlier,
when he was suspected of having improperly received gifts from labor leaders to influence his vote.
Though eventually cleared of all allegations, Ford was embarrassed to have the investigation drag on
until the eve of the 1976 election. Ford was particularly exasperated that the Special Prosecutor in
charge of the investigation was only serving part-time in the position, while continuing to teach at
Georgetown Law Center and thus had "neither the time nor the staff to expedite the probe." But Ford
felt he could not raise the matter with Attorney General Levi, "because I had given him my word that
I would never interfere with an investigation. Nor could I challenge the Special Prosecutor because that
would smack of Nixon and the Saturday Night Massacre all over again." FORD, supra note 23, at 418.
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tration, which came into office pledging to restore trust and integrity, quickly
found itself battered by the demands of "post-Watergate morality." Highly
publicized scandals forced the early departure of Carter's Director of the Office
of Management and Budget and his top adviser on drug policy and nearly forced
the resignation of the White House Chief of Staff. In the early months of the
Reagan Administration, National Security Adviser Richard Allen was forced to
resign over charges that he had failed to report a gift given by a foreign
journalist to Mrs. Reagan. None of these incidents ended with criminal
convictions or even with clear evidence of wrong-doing, but they confirmed that
"the appearance of impropriety" could readily touch off a torrent of bad
publicity in a press that had become especially alert to "scandal" after Watergate.
Washington's preoccupation with scandal was powerfully reinforced by
changes in law, which had a direct and powerful effect on the demand for the
services begun by John Dean's White House "law firm." The Ethics in
Government Act, enacted in 1978,' institutionalized a climate of public
suspicion, and consequent executive defensiveness, in two ways. First, it laid
down elaborate and very demanding public disclosure requirements for the
financial assets and income sources of government officials. Second, it provided
for the routine appointment of a "special prosecutor" (subsequently redesignated
an "independent counsel") to investigate and prosecute executive officials
suspected of criminal activity.
The heightened disclosure standards were designed to make it much easier
for journalists or other investigators to detect possible "conflicts of interest." As
the disclosure requirements began to approach the complexity of the tax code,
it also became easier for affected officials to make inadvertent mistakes in their
disclosure forms-a serious danger in an atmosphere in which the withholding
of information could be readily fanned into a "scandal" or perhaps indeed into
a criminal offense. This put pressure on the White House Counsel's Office to
provide precise guidance on disclosure requirements and to provide close
scrutiny of potential nominees for high positions, before congressional
committees and the press conducted their own scrutiny.4 7 In the 1980s, Counsel
Fred Fielding assured prospective nominees that the White House Counsel's
Office would be on their side in a fight with Congress or the press but blandly
conceded that nominees might wish to secure their own lawyers to assist them
in the early stages of preparing for confirmation proceedings.'
46. The Ethics Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1988). For brief descriptions of the scandals
cited above, see SUZANNE GARMENT, SCANDAL, THE CRISIS OF MISTRUST IN AMERICAN POLITICS 43-
47 (1991) (OMB Director Bert Lance); id. at 51 (Drug Adviser Peter Bourne); id. at 51-54 (Chief of Staff
Hamilton Jordan); id. at 59-64 (National Security Adviser Richard Allen).
47. Stewart quotes Fred Fielding's estimate that his office had screened more than 4800 appointees
over the previous five years "for conflict of interest and other problems." Stewart, supra note 37.
48. Fred Fielding, Presidential Appointments, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Spring 1983, at 13:
As a practical matter, the candidate with a complicated financial picture or controversial
appointment must remember that the first obligation of the Counsel to the President's Office
is to its client, the President. Ordinarily.... our goals and the candidate's are mutual; but the
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The specter of the independent counsel put still more pressure on the
Counsel's Office, since it meant that those already in office had to be much more
alert to possible legal infractions. The Ethics Law requires the appointment of
an independent counsel whenever there is some evidence of wrongdoing. The
independent counsel then has no effective hierarchical supervision or constrain-
ing accountability. The independent counsel is literally on his own with no
competing cases or assignments to distract from the "case" assigned. And where
ordinary prosecutors usually do not announce the targets of their investigations
until ready to seek an indictment, the mere appointment of an independent
counsel immediately generates public attention and the blackening of reputa-
tions, even when no indictment ultimately ensues. 49 Far from slackening with
time, new legislation at the outset of the Bush Administration strengthened
disclosure and conflict of interest requirements in response to perceived laxness
on these matters in the Reagan Administration." In these circumstances, the
advice of the White House Counsel has taken on much greater importance.
The White House Counsel is by no means the only source for advice about
steering clear of legal or ethical violations. There is a separate Office of
Government Ethics for the executive branch and, in addition, every agency and
department has its own general counsel and legal staffs. Even within the
Executive Office of the President, general counsels and legal staffs have
proliferated in the past two decades. Just as the White House has its own legal
counsel, separate "counsels" were also installed to advise the Office of
Management and Budget, the Council on Environmental Quality, the Office of
the U.S. Trade Representative, the Council on Wage and Price Stability, the
National Security Council, the Office of White House Administration, the Office
of National Drug Control Policy Coordination, and even the Office of the Vice
President-all within the White House or the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent."
candidate facing difficult financial and other decisions may find it worthwhile-and
comforting-to have his own counsel in all deliberations.
49. For politically sophisticated accounts of how the system actually operates, see Terry Eastland,
The Independent Counsel Regime, PUBLIC INTEREST, No. 100, Summer 1990, at 68-80; see also
GARMENT, supra note 46, at 83-108.
50. New ethics legislation in 1989 further tightened disclosure requirements and put more severe
limits on post-employment lobbying or consulting by former government officials.
51. The units within the Executive Office of the President (which was first established in 1939) have
varied considerably over the past fifty years. The Council on Wage and Price Stability, for example, was
created by the Ford Administration, then abolished by the Reagan Administration. Many units have
been renamed and reshuffled over the years, making it difficult to make clear comparisons from one
decade to the next. But it is clear from successive editions of the U.S. Government Organization Manual
that the trend has been toward the proliferation of separate "counsels." In 1957, for example, only the
president and the "Office of Defense Mobilization" within the EOP had their own designated "counsels,"
while even the Bureau of the Budget did not have a designated counsel. By 1961, the Bureau of the
Budget had its own "general counsel." By 1976, there were six units in the EOP with their own "general
counsel" in addition to the president's own "Counsel."
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The White House Counsel's Office cannot remain aloof, however, so long as
scandal will rub off on the White House itself. Accordingly, while prospective
presidential appointees are duly screened for conformity with ethics and
disclosure laws by the legal staffs of the departments or agencies to which they
will appointed, the entire screening process is carefully rechecked by the White
House Counsel's Office in a process known to lawyers involved as an "ethics
scrub." A nomination that blows up in scandal, or even in petty disputes over
what was or was not properly disclosed, will blacken, not the agency involved,
but the president who made the nomination. Similarly, when a dispute arises
about an official's compliance with ethics requirements, the press looks
immediately to the White House for its reaction, and it is the reaction of the
White House Counsel that wins attention, much more than that of the lawyers
on hand at the agency involved.
A situation of this kind is a delicate matter for the White House Counsel.
No lawyer wants to make snap decisions on a "case" before closely studying the
facts and carefully reviewing the relevant law. But when the White House is
pressed for a response, the president or his top aides turn to the Counsel's
Office. Accordingly, the Counsel's Office tries to anticipate trouble by screening
prospective nominees and has tried to acquire the staff resources and expertise
to deal with trouble when it does arise. For example, when Bob Martinez,
President Bush's "Drug Czar," was accused of mishandling campaign funds, it
was the White House Counsel who was quoted in the first media story on the
legal standards applicable to the incident. 2
Staff lawyers who served in the Counsel's Office during the Bush years report
that the great bulk of staff resources were spent on "ethics" matters. But White
House lawyers also expend considerable time and effort handling related legal
questions. For example, during the last years of the Reagan Administration,
very substantial legal resources in the White House were devoted to screening
and cataloguing internal documents to accommodate congressional and
independent counsel probes of the Iran Contra scandal.53 Even without the
pressure of a major scandal, the Counsel's Office plays a central role in
deliberations about when executive privilege should be invoked to shield
high-level executive communications from disclosure to congressional commit-
tees. There are also periodic questions about distinguishing campaign activities
from governing activities in the allocation of expenses, questions about which
White House records must be preserved under the Federal Records Management
Act.M In sum, the full range of "ethics" and "disclosure" requirements has
generated a continual demand for legal services in the White House, especially
52. Michael Isikoff, Martinez Used His Drug Policy Office to Route Funds for Bush Campaign,
WASH. PosT, Jan. 9, 1992, at Al. Gray's opinion is cited here by Martinez's own counsel, Terrence Pell.
53. Quade, supra note 29, at 7.
54. Id; See 90 Stat. 2723 (1976). 44 U.S.C.A. §§ 2103, 2108, 2111 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993).
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as changing requirements accumulating over the past fifteen years have opened
new sources of doubt and ambiguity for lawyers outside the White House.
This fact goes far in explaining the continual growth of the White House
Counsel's Office over the past two decades. Yet, the pressure of ethics
requirements is not a complete explanation, since much of the work generated
by "ethics" laws can be shared with other agencies, particularly the Justice
Department. The question, then, is why the White House has not relied more
fully on the Justice Department in dealing with these new pressures, instead of
building up its own staff resources. There is a ready answer: the same
post-Watergate pressures that generate demands for lawyering on behalf of the
White House have, at the same time, significantly complicated and often strained
White House relations with the Justice Department. This situation not only
makes the White House more eager for in-house legal expertise to cope with
"ethics" issues. It also makes the White House more inclined to lean on these
same internal lawyering resources in coping with other issues that would
previously have been handled almost entirely through the Justice Department.
IV
"INDEPENDENT" JUSTICE, VITAL COUNSEL
The Attorney General is a member of the president's Cabinet, subject to
removal at will by the president, just like any other department head. By statute
and tradition, however, the Attorney General is responsible for advising all other
executive officers, including the president, on the meaning and requirements of
existing law.56 The Attorney General is also responsible for overseeing the
daily operations of the Department of Justice, which is constantly involved in
making disputable decisions about whether or not to proceed with particular
cases and about what arguments to urge before the courts.
There is, therefore, a built-in tension or ambiguity in the Attorney General's
role as chief law officer in the executive branch. Does the Attorney General
owe primary loyalty to the president who appoints him-or to the law which she
or he interprets and enforces? Put otherwise, should the Attorney General view
the president (or the president's administration) as a client and seek, in the
manner of a private lawyer, to find plausible legal constructions at every turn to
help "the client" to pursue a chosen path? Or should the Attorney General
address issues of legal construction in the manner of an idealized judge, seeking
the most persuasive reading of the law without regard to the policy consequenc-
es?
A recent study of the Attorney General's Office, aptly entitled, Conflicting
Loyalties, demonstrates that protests and polemics on behalf of different
55. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,222, 3 C.F.R. 306 (1964-65); Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716; Resolution to Make Technical Changes in the Ethics Reform Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-280, 104 Stat. 149 (1990) (codified throughout Title 18; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 207 (Supp.
IV 1992)).
56. 28 U.S.C. §§ 511, 512 (1988).
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conceptions of the office have been a recurring feature of federal politics since
the early nineteenth century.57  Prior to the creation of the Department of
Justice in 1870, however, Attorneys General had neither the statutory warrant
nor the staff capacity to direct the decisions of the U.S. Attorneys around the
country who carried on the bulk of legal work for the federal government. The
underlying issue remained rather academic for more than a generation thereafter,
given the limited scale of federal responsibilities and the relative weakness and
political passivity of presidents in that era.58
For most of the twentieth century, presidents seem to have expected their
Attorneys General to cooperate with their own political aims. Certainly, most
presidents bestowed the position on individuals whose partisan loyalties could be
trusted. President Harding appointed his campaign manager to head the Justice
Department. Attorney General Daugherty then proceeded to confirm partisan
suspicions by becoming entangled in the Teapot Dome Scandal.59 Despite this
experience, Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nixon also appointed their
campaign managers to be Attorney General, while Presidents Wilson, Truman,
and both Roosevelts all named political party chairmen or active campaigners to
the post.' Such appointees may not have converted the Justice Department
into compliant tools of presidential whim, but they certainly nurtured close and
cooperative relations between the Department of Justice and the White House.
As a Justice of the Supreme Court, for example, Robert Jackson dismissed as
mere partisan advocacy the advice he had earlier given to Franklin Roosevelt,
when serving as his Attorney General.61
As late as 1971, Victor Navasky's survey of the Kennedy Justice Department
cheerfully described it as "a 32,000 man addition to the White House staff for
random presidential business."'62 When Robert Kennedy did allow his scholarly
Solicitor General to take positions before the Supreme Court that disappointed
civil rights advocates, many of the latter were both baffled and angry, since they
assumed that a sympathetic administration could simply force the Justice
Department to embrace the positions they favored. Joseph Rauh, a prominent
civil rights advocate and past president of the liberal advocacy group Americans
for Democratic Action, was particularly emphatic:
57. NANCY BAKER, CONFLIcTING LOYALTIES, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
OFFICE, 1789-1990, 49-66, 67-77, 126-34 (1992).
58. CORNELL CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE MAKING
OF LEGAL POLICY 25-36 (1992).
59. BAKER, supra note 57, notes that Attorney General Daugherty was never directly linked to any
role in the Teapot Dome oil lease scandal, but there was so much suspicion around his activities (he was
nearly impeached before resigning in 1924) that investigations were set in motion eventuating in his
indictment for "conspiracy to defraud the government" on an unrelated matter-on which the charges
were finally dropped after two juries reached hung verdicts. Id. at 118-20.
60. Id. at 20-21.
61. "While it is not surprising that counsel should grasp support from such unadjudicated claims of
power, a judge cannot accept such self-serving press statements of the attorney for one of the parties as
authority for answering a constitutional question, even if the advocate was himself." Youngstown Sheet
and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, at 647 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
62. VICTOR NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE xiv (1971).
Page 63: Autumn 1993]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
The independence of the Solicitor is crap. The Attorney General is the top legal
officer. If the Solicitor General doesn't agree [with the position urged by civil
rights groups] he has every legal right not to argue it, but the Attorney General
and the President have to make the decision [about what arguments to make
before the Supreme Court].
The Solicitor General ended by adopting the views of the civil rights groups.'
Similarly, when William Rehnquist was nominated to the Supreme Court in 1971,
he was willing to defend his past activities in the Nixon Justice Department in
unapologetic terms. To Senator Edward Kennedy's urging that "your client was
the public as well," Rehnquist replied, "My client, in my position as the
Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel, is the Attorney
General and the president."'
The scandals associated with Watergate, which ultimately saw two successive
Attorneys General go to prison for partisan manipulation of the Justice
Department, brought a sharp swing of opinion in the opposite direction. In the
spring of 1974, as the Watergate drama was entering its final stages, Senator Sam
Ervin, hero of the Senate committee that investigated Watergate, proposed a bill
to limit sharply presidential appointment and removal powers in relation to the
Attorney General and the Justice Department so that the Justice Department
would function "much like the regulatory commissions." Congress was unwilling
to pursue such an extreme recourse, but it did register its distrust of the Justice
Department by diffusing litigating authority more extensively among federal
agencies and departments. 65
In this atmosphere, President Ford felt obliged to pick an Attorney General
"from outside the traditional political arena."' The man he picked, University
of Chicago president Edward Levi, had made a point of disavowing partisan
political ties and had no previous ties at all with Ford.67 In his confirmation
hearings, Levi was asked about his degree of independence from the White
House more than any other topic and gave repeated assurances of his intention
to "give my independent judgment" in relation to "legality" and "the kinds of
policies which are involved in the legality .... ,"" Both Ford and Levi
63. Id. at 287-94.
64. Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on the Nomination of William H.
Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to be Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
48 (1971), quoted in BAKER, supra note 57, at 194.
65. See Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
66. The phrase belongs to Ford. See Gerald R. Ford, Attorney General Edward H. Levi, 52 U. CHI.
L. REv. 284, 284 (1985).
67. Levi explained at his confirmation hearings that he had refused even to register with a political
party as an Illinois voter, lest this compromise his image of impartiality at the University of Chicago.
He was so unconnected with Ford that the two had never met before Ford interviewed him in connection
with the appointment. BAKER, supra note 57, at 142.
68. Nomination of Edward H. Levi to be Attorney General of the United States: Hearings before the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 7. BAKER, supra note 57, at 142-44, notes that such
intensive questioning about independence was not at all the previous historical norm, though it is
understandable in light of Watergate.
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apparently felt particular constraint in their mutual dealings thereafter and
maintained a formal distance.
The pattern continued under President Carter. Although Carter had
long-standing personal ties to Griffin Bell, his nominee for Attorney General,
Judge Bell had already been on the federal bench for fifteen years at the time
of his nomination and had taken no role in Carter's presidential campaign.69
Nonetheless the Senate again grilled Bell on the degree of independence he
expected to maintain from the White House. Bell repeatedly emphasized the
need for independence, noting at one point that as Attorney General "the people
are your client" and "if there's a conflict" with the President's preferences, "the
people prevail." He insisted that he would rebuff all approaches from White
House staff and resign rather than carry out a direct presidential directive he
regarded as improper. Bell insisted he would organize the Justice Department
as a "political neutral zone" and he seems to have made genuine efforts to
"professionalize" and "depoliticize" the Department of Justice.7"
Public statements about "independence" and "neutrality" might be
discounted as convenient political rhetoric rather than a meaningful guide to
administrative realities, but for two important facts. One was the new zeal of the
press in pursuing questions of "tampering" or impropriety in the "post-Watergate
era."71 This meant that affronted career lawyers, or lesser political appointees,
could find ready means of embarrassing political superiors by leaking disputes
about Justice Department actions to the press. Attorneys General and White
House staffs had to be on their guard in an era when even "the appearance of
impropriety" could develop into a major political headache.'
But there was also a second factor that gave life to protestations of
"independence" at the Justice Department. This was the fact that the Justice
Department already had important institutional traditions of legal professional-
ism and political independence-right along with political connections to the
White House. These professional traditions are driven by the need of the Justice
Department to maintain credibility with the courts, since much of the
Department's work is ultimately dependent on litigation or prosecution before
69. BELL & OSTROW, supra note 24, at 63-66, suggests that resistance to Bell's nomination really
derived from his history as a southern judge not as a Carter intimate but Bell was sufficiently mindful
of the "perception" of his intimacy with Carter that he resolved from the outset not to continue as
Attorney General during Carter's run for reelection.
70. CLAYTON, supra note 58, at 143-45, describes the hearings and Bell's response. See also BAKER,
supra note 57, at 151-56.
71. GARMENT, supra note 46, at 58-82, devotes an entire chapter to the phenomenon of "feeding
frenzies" in the press over alleged scandals or abuses. Id. at 58-82.
72. Attorney General Bell, for example, had to endure what he calls his "darkest days as Attorney
General," BELL & OSTROW, supra note 24, at 208, when the press sensed a scandal in his decision to
remove the Republican-appointed U.S. Attorney in Philadelphia in 1977, even though it is normal
practice to replace U.S. Attorneys with new appointees at the outset of a new administration. The press
sensed scandal because the incumbent Attorney charged that the removal was intended to deflect his
investigations of a local Democratic congressman. Bell attributes the media flap to the fact that "in the
afterglow of Watergate, the Caeser's wife, cleaner-than-a-hound's-tooth doctrine prevailed, and
appearances became more important than reality."
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the courts. Moreover, even those aspects of the Department's work which do
not directly involve litigation-such as advising federal agencies or the White
House on their legal duties-still require competent lawyering by the Depart-
ment, since those on the receiving end of legal advice need assurance that they
can depend on its worthiness before the courts, should the matter enter into
litigation at some later time. As a result, even the Nixon Administration, with
all its partisan zeal, retained the Johnson Administration's Solicitor General in
office for its entire first term.73 At the Office of Legal Counsel (originally
known as the Office of Executive Adjudications), a tradition developed that one
of the two deputies to the Assistant Attorney General in charge of that office
should be a career attorney for the Department, protected from political pressure
by civil service rules. And even in the Nixon Administration, the Office of Legal
Counsel operated without much political interference.74
As the Justice Department placed more emphasis on its independent
professionalism in the aftermath of Watergate, dealings between the Department
and the White House inevitably became more delicate. This enhanced the
importance of the White House Counsel's Office in several respects. First, the
White House Counsel came to be seen as the sole respectable link between the
White House and the formal legal machinery of the executive branch. Attorney
General Levi would contact Philip Buchen about potentially sensitive departmen-
tal matters. Buchen's office, in turn, became a "buffer between the political
world and the Justice Department."'75 Attorney General Bell insisted on
dealing only with the White House Counsel rather than other officials.76
Moreover, with the Justice Department held at arms length, the White House
Counsel became a much more important source of independent guidance and
information for the President. In some matters, the Justice Department seems
to have been cut out of presidential deliberations altogether. More often, the
Counsel's Office became an important, separate sounding board for White House
deliberations on policies to be implemented by the Justice Department.
77
The Reagan Administration, it is true, seems to have felt freer to depart from
this pattern, as Watergate sensitivities receded with the passage of time. Reagan
appointed two longtime personal associates to be Attorney General. In the first
73. REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, THE POLITICS OF LAW 55 (1991),
describes Solicitor General Griswold as an "ideological moderate."
74. Frank Wozencraft, OLC: The Unfamiliar Acronym, 57 A.B.A. J. 33, 36 (1971). James Michael
Strine reports that the practice of retaining a career lawyer as deputy for OLC continued through the
Carter and Reagan administrations. James Michael Strine, The Office of Legal Counsel: Legal
Professionals in a Political System 76, n.35 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of
Political Science, Johns Hopkins University).
75. BAKER, supra note 57, at 146.
76. James Michael Strine has discovered memos in the Carter library in which lawyers at the Office
of Legal Counsel at Justice protest to the White House Counsel that he must more rigorously enforce
the rule that White House staff not communicate to Justice except through the Counsel. Counsel Robert
Lifshutz subsequently fired off an angry memo to Press Secretary Jody Powell, when Powell asked for
OLC guidance on whether he could issue press passes for Soviet journalists. Strine, supra note 74, at
117-18.
77. BAKER, supra note 57, at 146-47, 161-63.
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term, White House Counselor Edwin Meese felt free to meet on his own with
Justice Department officials, discounting the advice of the much subordinated
actual Counsel, Fred Fielding.78 When Meese, himself, became Attorney
General, he continued to work closely with the White House. But the Reagan
Administration paid a price for this aggressive posture at the Justice Department.
Meese's personal financial troubles may have been bad luck but his aggressive
effort to change the law certainly provoked unwanted press attention. Among
other things, the large series in The New Yorker by Lincoln Caplan, castigating
the Meese Justice Department for pressuring the Solicitor General-and
featuring a long number of leaked claims from career attorneys at Jus-
tice-helped to revive the issue of "partisan manipulation."79
Even before the end of the Reagan Administration, there was a return to a
more cautious public approach. The appointment of Richard Thornburgh, a
relative outsider, as Attorney General signaled a return to earlier patterns.
President Bush retained Thornburgh for almost two years and relied on Counsel
Gray as a go-between. When William Barr was nominated to be Assistant
Attorney General for Legal Counsel, after previous service with Gray in the
Reagan White House, Senators grilled him on his "independence." And Barr
replied in the spirit of Levi and Bell, promising to form his own judgments.'
When Barr was promoted to the top job at Justice, he was asked to give similar
assurances-and did so."
The problem is that no White House can afford to be entirely indifferent or
aloof from the operations of the Justice Department. That is because the Justice
Department itself is entangled in major issues of domestic politics for which,
quite understandably and properly, voters hold the president responsible.
78. Meese was directly involved in deliberations leading to the politically disastrous change of policy
on tax exemptions for segregated schools which ultimately reached the Supreme Court in Bob Jones v.
Regan, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). A detailed account of the internal deliberations between Meese and Justice
and Treasury officials is provided in Eric A. Stem, The Case of the Segregated Schools (unpublished
manuscript case study of the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University) (April 18, 1983)
(catalogued as C 14-83-531).
79. Lincoln Caplan, The Tenth Justice, 63 THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 10, 1987, at 29; Lincoln Caplan,
The Tenth Justice (II), 63 THE NEW YORKER Aug. 17, 1987, at 30. Both are now in a single volume,
THE TENTH JUSTICE, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW (1987).
80. Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments, Hearings before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., Part I 84-88 (1989) (statement of William Barr) (Barr: "Attorney
General Thornburgh ... told me what he expected of me ... someone ... who would give him
intellectually honest, objective advice as to what the law is .... I don't believe it is the role of the
Office of Legal Counsel to try to push the law one way or the other, or to play an activist role in the
evolution of the law.").
81. Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., Part II, 142 (1991) (statement of Chairman Biden: "The Attorney
General is a member of the President's administration but his allegiance is not to the President alone
.... The Attorney General is more properly considered the people's lawyer. His allegiance must be
to the public.., he must be prepared to tell the President that a proposed course of action would violate
the Constitution or the laws ... even when that advice is not what the President wishes to hear....
[T~he Attorney General has unique responsibility to the public that requires him to maintain
independence from the President's personal and political interests.") (statement of William Barr: "when
an issue is brought to me, the first thing I do analytically is say, 'let's take the politics out of it."')
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V
THE INEVITABILITY OF LEGAL POLITICS
The rise of pressures associated with "ethics" laws has given the White House
a need for a substantial in-house legal staff The delicacy of White House
dealings with the Justice Department has heightened the usefulness of this staff
in other areas. But the underlying importance of the Counsel's Office finally
rests on the dramatically increased importance in recent times of constitutional
issues for the occupant of the Oval Office.
The prominence of constitutional issues in national politics is so much a
feature of recent decades that it is easy to forget how novel this pattern really
is in historical terms. Through most of U.S. history, the Supreme Court did not
play anything at all like the role it has now come to play in national
policymaking. It was not until the 1960s that the Supreme Court began to apply
the Bill of Rights to the states in a systematic way and to give real bite to the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There were certainly
controversial decisions of the Court before the 1960s. But they usually did not
tie the hands of politicians in significant ways. For example, Chief Justice
Marshall's endorsement of the Bank of the United States in McCulloch v.
Maryland 2 did not prevent President Jackson from pursuing his successful
"war on the Bank."' On the few occasions when the Supreme Court sought
to put a serious brake on national policy-as in the controversy over slavery in
the 1850s and over New Deal undertakings in the 1930s-the Court was
overridden by determined national majorities and never sought to challenge the
new dispensation thereafter.'
By contrast, the list of issues that have agitated constitutional law over the
past three decades is imposingly long. The bitter dispute, since Roe v. Wade,85
over the legal status of abortion must head the list. But there have also been
bitter disputes about a myriad of other issues including school integration and
"forced busing", affirmative action and "quotas", the "rights of the accused" and
the countering demand to "stop tying the hands of the police", capital
punishment, aid to religious schools and accommodation of religion in public
settings, free speech protection for pornography and libel, due process guarantees
for disruptive students in public schools, judicial supervision of prisons and state
psychiatric hospitals, and judicial direction of election districting.
What is striking about the controversies provoked by the Supreme Court in
the last thirty years is not only the number of issues but the extent to which they
have dragged on, in one form or another, for decades. In part, this reflects the
82. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
83. ALFRED KELLY, WINIFRED HARBISON AND HERMAN BELZ, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION,
ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 212-214 (6th ed., 1983).
84. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991) (for an argument that the resolution of these
disputes was so convincing as to amount to an informal, but nonetheless binding, popular amendment
of the Constitution).
85. 410 U.S. 113 (1979).
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simple depth of feeling on each side in many of these issues. It also seems to
reflect the fact that the Court, itself internally divided over most of this period,
has been unable or unwilling to impose clear, decisive resolutions to most of
these issues. Even the landmark decisions left a great deal for each side to fear
or to hope for in the future and subsequent decisions often traveled unpredict-
able lines, encouraging renewed efforts to rattle the Court into retreating or
goading it to further initiatives.'
Participation by organized advocacy groups in Supreme Court litigation offers
a neat register of the increasing-and enduring-polarization of opinion on
constitutional issues. By the end of the 1960s, liberal advocacy groups, like the
ACLU and the NAACP, were involved in almost half of all cases before the
Supreme Court, urging their views through amicus briefs when not directly
representing a party to the case.87 Conservative advocacy groups began to
spring up, tripling their rate of participation between 1969 and 1981, until their
levels of participation on key issues like abortion and "civil rights" nearly
matched that of the older liberal groups.' The monumental political battles
over the Supreme Court nominations of Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas
simply dramatized the underlying reality: constitutional law had become a fierce
political battleground in which even one additional vote on the Supreme Court
might make a decisive difference.
Two factors intensified this battleground and assured it presidential attention.
First, the polarization of opinion on so many constitutional issues entered into
the growing ideological polarization between the main political parties. In the
1950s and 1960s, for example, Southern Democrats were the most vehement
critics of Brown v. Board of Education and early efforts at school integration,
while leading figures in the civil rights coalition included many Republicans.89
By the 1970s, an ongoing realignment saw Republican presidents denouncing
"quota" schemes and demanding limits on "forced busing," while Democratic
presidential candidates were more or less obliged to defend such policies as party
orthodoxy.' As late as 1976, the Republican platform endorsed the Equal
Rights Amendment while the Democratic platform passed over the abortion
86. See Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court from Burger to Rehnquist in THE NEW AMERICAN
POLITICAL SYSTEM 84-85 (Anthony King ed., 2d ed., 1990).
87. Karen O'Connor & Lee Epstein, Court Rules and Workload: A Case Study of Rules Governing
Amicus Curiae Participation, 8 JuST. SYS. J. 35, 42 (1983).
88. Karen O'Connor & Lee Epstein, The Rise of Conservative Interest Group Litigation, 45 J. POL.
479, 481 (1983).
89. HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 29-30 (1990), notes that in the 1960 election,
Republican candidate Nixon was a "card carrying member of the NAACP," who "enjoyed a favorable
relationship with national civil rights leaders," while candidate Kennedy "had no reputation as a civil
rights advocate" and was attacked by Nixon, in one of their 1960 debates, for running with a vice-
preseidential candidate from the South who had voted against civil rights measures in the past. CHARLES
AND BARBARA WHELEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT 29-70 (1985), describes one crucial phase in that debate under the apt heading, "Republicans to the
rescue."
90. See Graham, supra note 89, at 443-449 n.92.
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issue in silence.9" Since 1980, successive Republican platforms have pledged
firm support to the pro-life cause while Democratic platforms have pledged
equally strong fealty to the pro-choice side.' As never before, new presidents
come to office with constitutional commitments-or at least with organized
constituencies seeking action on a well-developed agenda for constitutional law.
The partisan and ideological divisions were exacerbated, in turn, by
institutional divisions, as elections regularly seemed to yield Republican
presidents facing a Democratic-controlled Congress. This factor added an
urgency to ongoing constitutional disputes about presidential prerogatives and
the separation of powers. In principle, Democratic presidents may have as much
reason to assert and defend executive prerogatives as Republicans, and certainly
have done so in the past. But entrenched Democratic majorities in Congress
were bound to take a much more dismissive view of presidential claims with the
White House so regularly in Republican hands.93 By the same token, hard lines
in constitutional doctrine were bound to seem more appealing to Republican
presidents lacking a cooperative majority in Congress.94 Moreover, questions
about presidential prerogatives or separation of powers were sometimes
entangled with other constitutional or legal issues, as with the abortion
counseling regulations that came before the Supreme Court in Rust v.
Sullivan.95
In sum, presidents could not readily ignore constitutional issues. They were
pressed to take sides, to advance an agenda.% Of course, presidents always
have competing concerns and often find it politically prudent to pass over
tempting occasions for constitutional battle. The Counsel's Office is only one
participant in presidential deliberations on how, when or whether to enter a
constitutional dispute. But it is clearly an important participant.
VI
COUNSELING CONSTITUTIONAL STRATEGY
The most obvious way for the president to influence constitutional law is by
directing the Justice Department to take certain stands in legal arguments before
the courts. Presidents have, in fact, taken a direct interest in the briefs filed by
the Solicitor General. President Truman is known to have intervened in the
Solicitor's arguments in Shelley v. Kraemer (holding racially restrictive
covenants unenforceable), and President Eisenhower influenced the Solicitor's
91. 2 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 925-27 (1976 Democratic Platform) & 74-76 (1976 Republican
Platform) (Donald Bruce Johnson ed., 1978).
92. NATIONAL PARTY CONVENTIONS, 1831-1984, at 149 (1984 Democrats) & 155 (1984
Republicans) (Eva Marie Socha ed., 1987); NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS OF 1980, at 62 (Democrats)
& 183, 203 (Republicans) (Donald Bruce Johnson ed., 1982).
93. BENJAMIN GINSBERG & MARTIN SHEFTER, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS 16-19 (1990).
94. Id.
95. 118 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
96. See generally CLAYTON, supra note 58.
97. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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brief in Brown v. Board 1198 (on the means of enforcing the Court's earlier
ruling against school segregation). 99 In the Carter Administration, the White
House was closely involved in supervising briefs to be filed in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke" (on the permissible degree of racial
preference in higher education admissions). The President's involvement was
undertaken in a rather public way at the insistence of Vice President Mondale
and Health, Education and Welfare Secretary Califano. °1
In the Bush Administration, the White House openly prevailed on the
Solicitor General to modify the government's position in litigation to desegregate
Mississippi's system of higher education. The White House in this instance acted
in public view, in a case that had been handled by the Justice Department from
the beginning and it intervened after a meeting between the President and black
college officials from Mississippi who were essentially parties to the case.
102
Since the White House interventions in these cases secured changes in the
Solicitor General's briefs and did so without generating any great public
controversy or criticism, it might appear that the White House has broad
authority to overrule the Solicitor. But these cases are almost surely exceptions
to the general pattern. The White House in each case dealt with constituencies
who were viewed in sympathetic terms by the liberal advocacy groups who had
been loudest and most successful in denouncing the corruption of the Justice
Department by a "partisan" White House. In many circumstances, however,
once an issue reaches the Supreme Court, it may be politically awkward for the
White House to try to direct the Solicitor General on how to proceed with the
government's argument, given the professional pride of attorneys in the
Solicitor's office and the readiness of critics to seize on White House interference
as introducing "partisan" concerns into constitutional adjudication. 103 More-
98. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
99. See Philip Elman, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter and Civil Rights Litigation,
1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1987). It is probably no coincidence that both
were cases that did not emerge from previous federal positions but rather from private litigation by
advocacy groups, where the Justice Department was pressed to take a position as amicus at a later stage.
100. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
101. This episode is by now an oft-told tale. Joseph Califano gives one version, JOSEPH CALIFANO,
GOVERNING AMERICA 237-43 (1981); slightly different is the account in Bell & Ostrow, supra note 24,
at 28-32.
102. Ruth Marcus, Bush Shifts Stand on Aid to Black Colleges, Administration Now Supports
Increased State Funding in Mississippi Case, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1991, at A6; Ruth Marcus, Some
Justices Appear Skeptical of Mississippi Colleges' Racial Split, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1991, at A4.
Solicitor General Kenneth Staff had argued in his initial brief to the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Mabus,
that Mississippi would not be responsible to provide additional funding for traditionally black colleges
in the state higher education system. After the President's intervention, Starr's reply briefs took the
opposite line on this issue, urging that the state should supply additional funding. The case was finally
decided as U.S. v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992) (Mississippi having elected a new governor in the
interim).
103. Charles Fried, who served as Solicitor General in Reagan's second term, reports in his memoir
of the experience that career officials in the Solicitor's office "thought [they] should produce a
recommendation or a draft brief, which, if it was done properly, no mere political appointee like myself
could in good faith do other than accept." CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW, ARGUING THE REAGAN
REVOLUTION 37 (1991).
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over, the Supreme Court did not respond well to the arguments ultimately
submitted by the Solicitor in these cases and the interventions seem to have
generated resentment within the Justice Department."M
Such interventions may be most significant as a reminder of ultimate
presidential authority and they may give more leverage to the Counsel's Office
in following cases before they reach such an advanced stage. The president need
not have a direct meeting with the Solicitor General for the Counsel's Office to
obtain information about the drafting of briefs and to send discrete signals back
to the Solicitor's Office through various informal channels. A sizable permanent
legal staff at the White House makes this easier to do. In the Reagan
Administration, Attorney General Meese was committed to an active program
of conservative-oriented change in constitutional law and was actively involved
in deliberations within the Justice Department on the content of the Solicitor's
briefs to the Supreme Court. Meese probably did not need direction from the
White House and, having older and closer ties to the President than anyone on
the White House staff by that time, probably would not have taken much
direction from the White House. But his successor, Richard Thornburgh, was a
remote figure from the standpoint of the Justice Department1" and a sizable
Counsel's staff was probably of considerably more importance in this setting.
The president's position on any particular issue is more likely to prevail, of
course, if it comes before like-minded judges. So another obvious way for
presidents to try to influence the direction of constitutional law is through
appointments to the federal courts. The Reagan Administration, like the Nixon
Administration before it, certainly made no secret of its desire to alter the shape
of the law through the appointment of judges and Justices with a conservative
outlook. In both administrations, the Justice Department seems to have played
the principal role in selecting nominees, even for Supreme Court positions."
But the White House Counsel's Office can play an important role here, too, both
as a source of separate opinions and as a more flexible actor (because a less
visible and less accountable actor) than the Justice Department.
So, for example, when William Barr was nominated to be Attorney General,
shortly after the brutal fight over the Clarence Thomas nomination, he was
questioned closely by the Senate Judiciary Committee about the role of the
Justice Department in seeking out personal information to discredit Anita Hill,
who had accused Thomas of sexual harassment. Barr stoutly denied any Justice
Department involvement in feeding information to Republican Senators on the
104. Fried also notes that Justice Powell's controlling opinion in Bakke rejected the "precise
submission" of the Solicitor's brief on whether universities can "take race into account to remedy the
effects of societal discrimination." Id. at 200. For the Court's response in Fordice, see the anguished
concurrence by Justice Thomas.
105. DOUGLAS KMIEC, THE ATrORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER, INSIDE THE MEESE JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT 148 (1992), complains that Thornburgh maintained a "Howard Hughes-like environment"
of isolation and never responded in any way to the reports which Kmiec sent him on OLC's handling
of issues on its docket.
106. CLAYTON, supra note 58, at 40.
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Judiciary Committee but conceded that lawyers in the White House Counsel's
Office may have done so." This sort of activity may not require trained
lawyers, but it is hardly surprising that, following the fiasco of the Bork
nomination, the Bush Administration wanted a White House unit capable of
providing close support to Supreme Court nominees. The role is all the more
logical as the Counsel's Office has developed great experience in handling FBI
reports for executive nominees,"° and similar questions arise on how to
evaluate such materials and on what terms to disclose their contents to
congressional committees. Press accounts of President Clinton's deliberations
before the nomination of Ruth Ginsberg to the Supreme Court indicate that
Counsel Bernard Nussbaum played a key role in the White House deliberations,
much more so, it appears, than the Justice Department. 1°9
But these most obvious paths to influencing constitutional law may not be the
most important. Constitutional law is not simply a set of pronouncements from
the courts. And even the judge-made law is influenced by a much wider context
than the briefs immediately presented or the personal inclinations of the judges.
Constitutional issues often arise in the course of operations in other parts of the
executive branch. When a constitutional question arises (or an important
statutory question) regarding an agency's authority to undertake a proposed
action, the matter is usually referred to the Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC")in
the Justice Department. Referrals of this sort can take place without any
involvement from the White House or the White House Counsel's Office. Once
an issue is under consideration at OLC, it is considered a breach of decorum for
the White House to review draft opinions. In most cases, OLC does proceed
quite independently.11 ° Nonetheless, the White House Counsel's Office can
sometimes make a difference in the maneuvering that takes place before a
question is formally submitted to OLC.
The White House undoubtedly has some leverage on how and whether
agencies submit requests for legal guidance to OLC. For example, James
Michael Strine has documented that during the Carter Administration the White
House Counsel's Office was closely involved in negotiations between the
Department of Labor and the Department of Transportation to determine
appropriate limits on the application of minimum wage laws to local transit
systems."'l Lawyers in the affected departments were divided on the applica-
107. Confirmation Hearings-William P. Barr, supra note 80 at 47.
108. STEWART, supra note 37, notes that Counsel Fielding reviewed more than 2500 reports on
executive appointments.
109. Richard L. Berke, Clinton Names Ruth Ginsberg, Advocate for Women, to Court, N.Y. TIMES,
June 14, 1993, at Al.
110. KMIEC, supra note 105, at 207, insists that "OLC would never permit the prescreening of its
draft opinions."
111. Strine, supra note 74, at 133-90. Griffin Bell reports that the White House was also closely
involved in deliberations on whether, under the First Amendment, funds could be distributed to religious
schools under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 801 (1985). OLC
lawyers originally ruled against doing so, but Vice President Mondale and Domestic Council Chief
Stewart Eizenstadt prevailed on President Carter to overrule OLC. The new position was reflected in
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tion of Supreme Court decisions on the Tenth Amendment, and the Counsel's
Office involved itself in part for the very purpose of avoiding an overly formal
resolution of the dispute by OLC.112
In the Bush Administration, the White House certainly did not interfere with
the FBI when it sought guidance on whether it would be unlawful to apprehend
terrorists or drug traffickers on foreign soil without the consent of the host
country. The OLC returned an opinion declaring such apprehensions to be
perfectly legal-though on the very same question, the Assistant Attorney
General for Legal Counsel had given a diametrically opposed ruling in the Carter
Administration."t3 On the other hand, the Bush Administration did not seek
guidance from OLC on whether, as prominent conservative legal advocates had
urged, the White House could assert a line-item veto by treating appropriation
measures as a collection of separate "bills." Lawyers in the White House
Counsel's Office had already determined that the chances of a favorable ruling
from OLC were too unlikely.114
Nothing in protocol prevents the White House Counsel from directly phoning
the Assistant Attorney General for Legal Counsel to ask about the likelihood of
one or another legal argument being sustained by OLC. For example, Douglas
Kmiec's memoir, which is quite insistent about OLC's refusal to circulate draft
opinions for White House review, reports a number of informal advance inquiries
from the White House Counsel on what OLC would be likely to say if a question
were formally submitted.115 These discussions may sometimes give the Counsel
a chance to suggest lines of argument that the White House would like to see
adopted. As the Counsel's Office is in constant communication with OLC on
other presidential business, there are many opportunities to exchange views. Nor
Department of Labor regulations subsequently ruled unconstitutional by the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals; Justice did not appeal the decision. BELL & OSTROW, supra note 24, at 24-28.
112. BELL & OSTROW, supra note 24, at 181-86.
113. See "Testimony of William Barr, Assistant Attorney General for Legal Counsel," FBI Authority
to Seize Suspects Abroad: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights, Comm. on
the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1989) (summarizing the change
in OLC rulings and explaining that the new opinion was issued after "the FBI asked the Office of Legal
Counsel ... to reexamine its 1980 opinion.") Barr insisted that the new ruling did not represent a
"changed Department of Justice policy" because it was "strictly a legal analysis of the FBI's authority
as a matter of domestic law .... The 1989 opinion takes no position, supporting or opposing, as a
matter of policy, the use of the FBI or any other executive branch officials to make apprehensions in
contravention of customary international law." Id. at 5. Barr did not explain why this "strictly legal
analysis" came to the opposite conclusion of the legal analysis offered by OLC in 1980. He also insisted
that neither the 1980 nor the 1989 opinions could be made available to Congress (nor to anyone else
outside the executive branch), because these opinions had to remain "confidential ... based on the very
same principles that the attorney-client privilege in general is based upon." Id. at 4. Many OLC
opinions have been published over the years (as Barr acknowledged at the hearing), but these were not
among them.
114. Arguments on behalf of the veto by conservative advocates are collected in L. GORDON
CROVITZ, PORK BARRELS AND PRINCIPLES: THE POLICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL VETO (National
Legal Center for the Public Interest ed., 1988), and elaborated in L. Gordon Crovitz, The Line Item Veto,
18 PEPP. L. REv. 43-55 (1990). President Bush acknowledged he did not have the authority to exercise
a line item veto in a public speech on budget procedures on March 20, 1992.
115. KMIEC, supra note 105, at 91, 207.
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are these exchanges limited to formal consultations between the Counsel,
personally, and the actual Assistant Attorney General for Legal Counsel.
Assistants and staff attorneys at both the White House and the Justice
Department are also in regular contact on common projects.
It is difficult to determine the direction of influence in these communications,
which are usually conducted by telephone or in personal meetings rather than by
formal exchange of memos. It is in the interest of the Counsel's Office to give
the appearance that the White House is abiding by detached, professional advice
from OLC. And it is in the interest of OLC to foster the same image. On the
other hand, OLC attempts to avoid generating the perception in the White
House that it is a balky obstacle to White House policy aims. In the past,
Assistant Attorneys General have impressed the White House enough to gain
impressive promotions: Antonin Scalia and William Rehnquist, both of whom
served as Assistant Attorney General at OLC in the 1970s, were rewarded with
seats on the Supreme Court. President Bush's initial appointee at OLC, William
Barr, was subsequently promoted to Attorney General while Barr's successor at
OLC was appointed an appellate judge at a young age."6 The OLC probably
does not need to be reminded of the advantages of cooperating with the White
House. An enlarged White House Counsel's Office, however, makes it easier for
OLC to learn what the White House would like or at least to discern the legal
traps of greatest concern to the White House.
The importance of such links goes beyond the immediate content of OLC
rulings. Since issues initially framed by OLC for the guidance of federal agencies
may eventually be drawn into constitutional litigation, the OLC's interim
resolution in effect sets an agenda for the Supreme Court. This was the pattern,
for example, in the litigation that led to the Court's decisions in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro Transit Authority'1 7 (on federal power under the Tenth
Amendment), in Rust v. Sullivan"' (on withholding aid to family planning
clinics that advised clients on abortion), and in United States v. Humberto
Alvarez-Machain 9 (on circumventing formal extradition procedures to
apprehend criminals on foreign soil).
VII
COUNSELING PRESIDENTIAL ACTION
Legal advice for the White House is most important when the president must
act directly in his own name. Here, too, the OLC usually plays an important role
in advising the president. But the White House Counsel's Office can be an
116. J. William Luttig was appointed a judge on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
117. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
118. 118 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). KMIEC, supra note 105, at 86-88, describes reconsideration of a 1970 law
by OLC-at the prompting of private, pro-life advocacy groups-which led the White House to direct
the Department of Health and Human Services to draft the new regulations ultimately challenged in
Rust.
119. 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
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important link between OLC and the White House. And on the most sensitive
matters, the judgment of the Counsel may be relied upon much more than the
legal arguments of OLC.
The president's role in the legislative process poses legal questions with most
regularity. Since the era when Samuel Rosenman advised Presidents Roosevelt
and Truman, every Counsel has spent much time in scrutinizing (and often in
drafting) presidential messages to Congress, with special attention to signing
statements or veto statements on enrolled bills. Considerations of policy and
politics are, of course, particularly hard to separate from the legal and
constitutional issues that can arise in presidential deliberations on new legislation.
A formalized review process, coordinated by the Office of Management and
Budget, is designed to ensure that the president will have the benefit of policy
concerns affecting new legislation from all relevant agencies and departments
within the executive establishment. But by virtue of his proximity to the Oval
Office, the Counsel's words are always among the last words the president hears.
On legal questions, the Justice Department is always consulted and may have
stronger or more developed views than the Counsel, but the Counsel's leanings
may affect how seriously OLC's advice is weighed at the White House. Charles
Cooper, who served as Assistant Attorney General for Legal Counsel toward the
end of the Reagan Administration, complained that OLC advice was frequently
discounted by the White House. In Cooper's view, the White House lawyers
were more concerned with immediate political goals than with the constitutional
doctrines on presidential power emphasized by OLC.120 Cooper's successor,
Douglas Kmiec, notes that OLC on one occasion prepared an elaborate
constitutional argument for a veto message on the South Africa sanctions bill.
Reagan vetoed the measure, but the Counsel's Office deleted the constitutional
arguments from the message, and Congress subsequently voted to override the
veto.121
A recent study of OLC by political scientist James Michael Strine argues that
OLC became more eager to assert legalistic positions on the separation of
powers through the 1970s and 1980s as the Justice Department, in general,
became more removed from the immediate political concerns of the White
House-and this, in turn, made presidents more inclined to rely on the more
accommodationist advice of the Counsel's Office.122 It is not inevitable that the
Counsel's Office will always be more inclined to compromise with Congress.
President Bush's Counsel, C. Boyden Gray, seems to have championed a strong
view of presidential prerogatives, in full accord with Justice Department lawyers
120. "Preserving presidential prerogatives, protecting the office itself, was not viewed as that
important. Far more important was getting a good political result or avoiding a bad one." Quoted in
TERRY EASTLAND, ENERGY IN THE EXECUTIVE 330 n.24 (1992).
121. KMIEc, supra note 106, at 56. The reenacted measure, The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086, is codified in 22 U.S.C. § 5001 (1988).
122. Strine, supra note 74, at 191-252.
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and the Counsel's Office devoted considerable effort to elaborating constitutional
objections (on separation of powers grounds) in presidential veto statements.2
Gray indeed went so far as to voice a public protest against a proposed
legislative deal, allowing a congressional veto mechanism to win support for
congressional funding of aid to the Contra rebels in Nicaragua. Gray warned
that this would resemble an unconstitutional legislative veto and set a dangerous
precedent for congressional checks on presidential power in foreign affairs. 24
But this may have been the exception that proves the rule. The arrangement
with Congress was negotiated by lawyers for Secretary of State James Baker, and
Gray was evidently kept out of these negotiations so that Baker's team would
not have to deal with Gray's constitutional objections."2  In the end, last-
minute cautions from Gray did not prevent President Bush from signing the
Contra funding bill, and Gray was scolded for voicing his objections outside the
White House.126
Where presidents are determined to act, the Counsel has neither the legal
authority nor the career incentives to stand in the way. Perhaps for this reason,
presidents have leaned much more on the Counsel's advice in moments of crisis,
when the president must take direct action on his own. During the Mayaguez
affair, for example, President Ford had to consider not only the diplomatic and
military issues posed by the seizure of a U.S. ship by the communist government
of Cambodia. He also had to consider questions of presidential prerogative,
complicated by the passage of the War Powers Resolution in 1973. White House
logs showed that Ford consulted continuously with his Counsel Philip Buchen,
but the President did not meet at all with Attorney General Edward Levi during
the course of the crisis.127 It may be that Ford did not want to put Levi in the
position of having to argue against measures on which the President was already
determined. Clearly, the President was more confident and comfortable relying
on his Counsel. And it seems likely that Ford's decision to direct air strikes
against communist forces, without consulting Congress in advance, was supported
by the Counsel's interpretations of the War Powers Resolution and the
President's constitutional authority. It is unclear, however, whether the Counsel
123. Chuck Alston, Bush Crusades on Many Fronts to Retake President's Turf, CONG. Q. WKLY REP.,
Feb. 3, 1990, at 291 (William Barr, then heading the OLC at Justice, is quoted in regard to increased
cooperation with White House Counsel's Office on separation of powers issues: "The Reagan
administration never had this kind of cohesion." Id. at 292). Strine, supra note 74, at 298, offers similar
characterizations.
124. David Hoffman & Ann Devroy, Bush Counsel Contests Contra Aid Plan, Gray Fears Pact with
Congress May Infringe on Presidential Power, WASH. PosT, Mar. 26, 1989, at A5.
125. Id.
126. Hoffman, supra note 33.
127. BAKER, supra note 57, at 147-49, notes the dramatic contrast between Attorney General Robert
Kennedy's constant attendance at White House deliberations during the Cuban Missile Crisis and Levi's
complete absence. Baker acknowledges that the contrast "raises the disturbing possibility that Presidents
appoint Neutral officers [to head the Justice Department] in response to external demands and then
proceed to circumvent them when their legal assessments are unwelcome." Id. at 149. Levi's distance
during the Mayaguez affair is the more striking because, as Baker notes, records show that Ford did
meet frequently with Levi on many other occasions outside formal Cabinet meetings. Id. at 149-50.
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advised him that the War Powers Resolution was inapplicable to these
circumstances or simply that it was always inapplicable because unconstitution-
al. t128
During the Bush Administration, the White House Counsel presided over
several meetings of top officials from the Defense Department and the State
Department, along with top officials from OLC, to consider the legal options of
the President in a particular foreign crisis. The White House never took a stand
contrary to the advice of OLC. But the fact that the White House Counsel
presided over the meetings was a tacit acknowledgement that OLC could not
simply impose its own views.
129
The weight of the Counsel's Office was revealed in a less dramatic incident
that developed in the last months of the Bush Administration, when President
Bush sought to impose a direct order on the U.S. Postal Service. The Service
wanted to appeal an adverse decision by the Postal Rate Commission on
proposed rate hikes. When the Justice Department declined to argue the
Service's appeal, the Postal Service sought to file appeal briefs on its own.
President Bush, asserting his executive authority over a nominally "independent"
service, ordered the Postmaster General to desist from the appeal." ° When the
Board of Governors of the Postal Service expressed their disagreement, President
Bush reasserted his authority in a letter signed by Counsel C. Boyden Gray."'
The White House in this instance was backing a position favored by the Justice
Department. But the position certainly had more weight coming from the
President.132  As always, the Counsel's letter had authority only because it
could present itself as the President's view. Yet it is a fair question whether the
President would have committed himself to such a strong position on an arcane
issue without the prompting of a Counsel's Office that had been eager to
undermine the "independence" of so-called "independent" agencies. In the end,
the position was too extreme for the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled
in subsequent litigation on behalf of the Postal Service's right to pursue litigation
independent of Justice Department consent or White House approval.133
128. Lloyd Cutler insists that, following the enactment of the War Powers Resolution over President
Nixon's veto in 1974, "all subsequent Presidents have challenged" its constitutionality. Lloyd Cutler, The
Constitutional Sharing of the War Power, 11 GEO. MASON U.L. REv. 221 (1988).
129. Interview with C. Boyden Gray (May 12, 1993). Gray explained that the White House Counsel
had to chair these meetings, "because Justice is just one of the departments at the meeting."
130. See Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an Independent Agency
Independent?, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 273 (1993).
131. Lawyers in Counsel's Office say that considerable thought was given to whether the letter
should be signed by President Bush, but it was finally decided that such a long legal argument would
seem odd coming directly from the President.
132. It was still thought more appropriate to issue the letter in the President's name rather than
through the Justice Department, because the Justice Department would, in effect, have been ruling in
its own case (on the underlying question of litigating authority) and the President's name would carry
more authority.
133. See Mail Order Ass'n of America v. U.S. Postal Service, 986 F.2d 509 (D.C.Cir. 1993). To
prevent the White House from undoing this decision, a federal district judge shortly thereafter issued
an order prohibiting President Bush from removing the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Postal Service. See Mackie v. Bush, 809 F.Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1993).
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The new Clinton Administration also invoked the legal advice of the White
House Counsel in a matter that touched on presidential prerogatives in an
unusual setting. President Clinton appointed his wife, an experienced lawyer, to
chair a task force to assess major proposals for health care reform. Advocacy
groups for the medical profession protested that the task force meetings should
be open to the public, under the requirements of the Federal Advisory
Committee Act ("FACA")." Clinton White House Counsel Bernard
Nussbaum then issued a legal memorandum, under his own name, arguing that
Mrs. Rodham Clinton was the equivalent of a government official and her
meetings with other government officials in the task force could remain closed
to the public under the FACA exemption for meetings limited to government
officials and employees.
In subsequent litigation, the federal district court in Washington, D.C.,
rejected the Counsel's reasoning, ruling that Mrs. Rodham Clinton could not be
a federal official or employee within the terms of FACA and some, at least, of
the task force meetings must therefore be open to the public. 35 The D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals overruled this decision, however.136 The court held
that FACA must be interpreted in a more accommodating spirit, allowing
meetings with the First Lady to remain closed to the public under the FACA
exemption for meetings limited to government officials and employees, as the
White House Counsel had claimed. But the court rested this conclusion solely
on the ground that if FACA were not interpreted to cover the First Lady, the
statute might be considered an unconstitutional intrusion on executive privilege,
which is supposed to secure advice to the president from outside scrutiny. A
concurring opinion, rejecting this interpretation of the First Lady's status under
FACA as "overly strained," indeed argued that FACA should be held
unconstitutional as applied to advisory groups organized to give direct advice to
the president. Yet the government itself was clearly reluctant to make this
argument, which presumably would have raised some hackles in Congress.137
The decision proved awkward in another way. In a footnote, the Court
raised, without resolving, the question of whether Mrs. Rodham Clinton, if
134. 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 1 (1988)).
135. Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 813 F.Supp. 82 (D.D.C.1993).
136. Association of American Physicians and Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898 (D.C.Cir. 1993).
137. The majority opinion notes:
The government, only at oral argument, and rather tentatively, suggested that the application
of FACA to any advisory groups established and utilized by the President, because they advise
someone in the Executive Office of the President, raises constitutional problems. We do not
think we should entertain a constitutional argument of such enormous significance made in so
glancing a fashion. After all, it could be thought to come close to an argument that the
government disavowed-that FACA is unconstitutional on its face.
Id. at 912 n.12. The Justice Department pressed more strongly the arguments that the task force should
be exempt because it did not meet face to face with the President and that, in considering constitutional
difficulties, the main weight should be given to the infringement on the President's constitutional power
to "recommend" legislation (which would have limited application of the constitutionally-forced
exception to FACA to committees specifically concerned.with new legislation).
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considered a government official for purposes of FACA, would not also then
have to be considered a government official in relation to conflict of interest
standards.'38 The White House Counsel's Office subsequently acknowledged
that it had previously ruled that Mrs. Rodham Clinton was not subject to such
standards and had not yet, at the time of the court of appeals ruling, transferred
her personal financial holdings to a blind trust."' There was the potential for
still another constitutionally charged dispute in this claim that the First Lady, like
the President and Vice-President, must be understood to be exempted from the
conflict of interest laws. Yet none of the White House Counsel's rulings on the
status of Mrs. Rodham Clinton-for all their potential constitutional implica-
tions-had been cleared with the OLC.14 The Counsel's Office seems to have
felt confident that it could provide the President with adequate "advice"-even
advice that would be invoked and relied upon in sensitive public controversies
and ensuing litigation-without bothering to coordinate its position with the
Justice Department.
The Clinton White House may have been irregular in this respect. The
Administration was very slow in making appointments to the Justice Department
and did not have its own appointees in place at OLC (or even in the Attorney
General's Office) when initial positions had to be taken on the status of the First
Lady. The apparent suicide of Associate Counsel Vincent Foster, who according
to some reports was depressed at mistakes in the work of the Counsel's Office,
may have had a chastening effect. But the episode illustrates the way in which
the Counsel's Office, in its eagerness to smooth the way for preferred presiden-
tial policies, can launch the White House on a legal argument with very serious
constitutional implications. Boyden Gray claims never to have taken a position
on a major issue without consulting OLC and never to have advised the
President in opposition to OLC's findings.'41 No doubt, this is the norm. But
the presence of the Counsel's Office is an invitation to the White House to take
more convenient advice closer to home.
At every stage of the president's involvement with the development of
constitutional law, then, the Counsel's Office may play an important role in the
background. Even if its actions are unseen, the effects of the Counsel's activities
may register in the ultimate results. The Counsel's advice or actions may not
always be directed toward safeguarding presidential prerogatives. And advice
or actions intended to strengthen the president's constitutional authority may fail
in the courts or provoke more constraining, new legislation from Congress. But
whatever the advice and action taken by the president-and often by his
138. Id. at 911 n.10 ("We do not need to consider whether Mrs. Clinton's presence on the Task Force
violates ... any conflict of interest statute.").
139. Francis X. Clines, A Fatal Silence and a Chance to Address It, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1993, at 33.
140. William Safire, On Foster's Mind, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1993, at A17.
141. Interview with C. Boyden Gray (May 12, 1993); top aides to Gray confirm Gray's recollection
on this point.
[Vol. 56: No. 4
WHITE HOUSE COUNSEL
appointees in executive departments-the legal calculations of the Counsel's
Office in the White House will play an important role.
VIII
CONCLUSION: WHAT TO MAKE OF THE COUNSEL?
Since the White House Counsel's Office has no statutory basis, any president
is free, at least in principle, to dispense with the entire office. Yet law is not the
only constraint on presidential staffing choices. The political scientist Hugh
Heclo put the point quite well more than a decade ago:
At first blush it would seem that the internal arrangements of his own office are
simply a matter of presidential taste. And so they are in all unimportant
respects .... In terms of deep structure, however, the office is largely a given
that a president can change slowly if at all. This structure is the web of other
people's expectations and needs. On the surface, the new president seems to
inherit an empty house. In fact, he enters an office already shaped and crowded
by other people's desires. ... What the winner [of the presidential election]
grasps is an office that is the raw, exposed ganglion of government where
immense lines of force come together in ways that no single person can
control.142
By now it is simply inconceivable that a president could dispense with the
White House Counsel's Office or even pare it back to the single "special
counsel" with one or two assistants with which presidents operated before 1970.
The president may not be commanded by law to maintain a Counsel's Office, but
the law commands him to address a whole range of ethics and disclosure matters
within the White House that require the continuing attention of a Counsel's
Office. The President must operate with a political culture that constrains him
from treating the top officials of the Justice Department as a compliant gang of
cronies, solely attentive to his own concerns. And yet the president must still
respond to pressures to address pressing constitutional issues of the day without
appearing to engage in "partisan manipulation." The Counsel's Office, as it
responds to deeply rooted needs at the White House, has a secure future in the
president's inner court.
A dozen lawyers in the White House cannot substitute for the Department
of Justice. They cannot compete with the resources of the Justice Department
for careful and extensive legal research. They cannot even compete with the
managerial resources of the Attorney General (or in practice, the Deputy
Attorney General) for monitoring all of the potentially sensitive or important
decisions that may arise in the course of routine business at the Justice
Department or elsewhere in federal agencies and departments. And the
limitations of the Counsel's Office go beyond the question of resources. Top
officials of the Justice Department are constrained by Senate confirmation,
142. Hugh Heclo, The Changing Presidential Office, in THE CHANGING PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE:
TOWARD PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNANCE 161-83, 165 (Arnold Meltsner ed., 1981).
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formal oaths, long-established procedures and protocols, a career staff with
professional norms and institutional memory-in short, with all the constraints
of an institutionalized "office." The White House Counsel operates informally,
usually in secret; it has no accountability to Congress and little institutional
memory or assured continuity, since it maintains almost no permanent records
and employs no ongoing, career staff.
In these circumstances, an enlarged Counsel's Office poses the same sorts of
dangers that critics have decried in the large White House staffs of recent
decades. 43 There is always the danger that impulsive, inexperienced aides,
puffed up with the prestige of the White House-and emboldened by the
absence of personal accountability-will seek to bully the main federal
establishments into reckless, ill-considered or improper actions in the service of
pet ideological nostrums or short-term political aims.'" One incident of this
kind was brought to light in the Clinton Administration and subsequently
acknowledged by the White House itself as improper.
The matter arose from the decision of top Clinton aides to reorganize the
White House travel office (which arranges transportation for journalists following
the President) and put this technical service in the hands of a personal relation
of President Clinton, who had financial ties to personal friends of the President.
The White House officially insisted that the travel office had to be reorganized
to correct serious abuses in the previous operation of the office. To lend weight
to this story, lawyers in the Counsel's Office met with FBI agents-without the
knowledge of the Director nor of the Attorney General-and directed the agents
on how to report on their initial investigation of supposed financial improprieties
in the administration of the travel office. Counsel Bernard Nussbaum
subsequently apologized to the Attorney General, but insisted, in his own follow-
up report on the episode, that no major wrong-doing had occurred in his
office.145
More serious abuses remain a perpetual danger, the more so as the influence
of the Counsel's Office remains very difficult to detect from the outside. How
far this danger materializes depends much on the character of the Counsel, and
on the character of top officials in the departments, particularly the Justice
143. See, for example, National Academy of Public Administration, A Presidency for the 1980s,
reprinted in THE ILLUSION OF PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT 299-341 (Hugh Heclo & Lester Salamon
eds., 1981). "Recommendation 1" of this report is: "The trend toward enlargement of the White House
staff should be reversed. Rigorous efforts should be made to keep this staff small." The explanation
supplied for this recommendation is that "it is here [at the level of White House staff] that the
temptation to speak on behalf of the President and to 'second-guess' the line agencies is especially
strong; the larger the staff, the wider the circle of persons who may yield to this temptation, and the
greater the chances of building an image, if not the reality, of White House aggrandizement." Id. at 318.
144. PAT-rERSON, supra note 21, at 141, offers this characteristic statement from an anonymous staff
lawyer at OLC: "We certainly did not want some young, faceless twenty-five year old White House
staffer taking issue with the Attorney General of the United States ... and then taking the issue to the
President in a memo which set forth two paragraphs and 'Mr. President, check the box below."'
145. Editorial desk, A Stealthy, Evasive Confession, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1993, § 4, at 18; Myopia at
the White House; The F.B.L, Abused, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1993, at A20.
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Department; it may depend, above all, on the character and attentiveness of the
President and his relations with the Counsel, on the one hand, and the Attorney
General and other Cabinet officers, on the other. The Clinton Administration
may be particularly vulnerable to such dangers having installed a relatively
obscure figure as Attorney General (a woman with no independent political
weight and no close ties to the President) and then having left her to face a
White House Counsel who is a far more experienced Washington hand and who
has far closer and more long-standing ties to the President and the First
Lady.1"
In spite of these dangers, it is unrealistic to expect the president, personally,
to attend to all the issues that enter the developmental stream of constitutional
law. If the president does not have a legal staff to assist him, he will have to rely
on the Justice Department. And in an era when constitutional law raises so
many competing expectations and concerns of such great political moment, the
Justice Department can hardly be expected to reach sound and acceptable
decisions on its own on all issues. If it is not influenced by the president, the
Justice Department is still likely to be influenced in many cases by the clamor
of interest groups, by the threats and signals of congressional committees and
congressional staff, and by the ideological and professional biases of lawyers
within the Department, itself. Presidents may still feel compelled to intervene
in the final decisions on Justice Department briefs before the Supreme Court, for
example. But it is far better to exert ongoing influence over the development
of "constitutional policy" from earlier stages, than to attempt a clumsy order at
the last minute.
Similarly, when the president deliberates on his own constitutional power to
act in a crisis or in a matter of controversy, he would be very foolish to ignore
the advice of the Justice Department, with its accumulated legal learning, its
research resources, and its long experience in defending presidential prerogatives.
The president's understanding of his legal options, however, may be enhanced
by access to legal advice that is not filtered through the institutional biases or
political preoccupations of the Justice Department. It is just this sort of "second
opinion" that the Counsel's Office can provide.
146. For early indications of grounds for concern on this score, see David Johnston, Reno's in Office;
Is She in Charge?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1993, at Al, reporting that Attorney General Janet Reno "risks
ceding chunks of the [Justice] Department to the White House and its legal counsel, Bernard W.
Nussbaum" because most of the top positions at Justice were chosen directly by the White House rather
than by Reno, herself. The Wall Street Journal subsequently reported the experience of journalists who
inquired about why the President's Task Force on Health Care Reform was organizing a public meeting
in apparent violation of the Federal Advisory Committee Act and of a court order on March 10 to abide
by its terms: when they sought legal rationales for this at the Department of Justice, the official Justice
spokesperson told them to "call the White House." Editorial desk, The Wizards of Oz, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 29, 1993, at A12. Earlier, Janet Reno ordered the removal of all incumbent U.S. Attorneys before
any successors for them had been secured-an entirely unprecedented step, putting partisan loyalty
above all considerations of continuity. She explained that the decision was a "joint decision with the
White House," an explanation widely interpreted to mean that the White House had simply ordered the
Attorney General to do so.
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Responding to calls for a reduced White House staff, political scientist
Samuel Kernall noted that the large staff is the symptom and not the cause of
White House needs to intervene more actively in departmental affairs:
To assume that the governability of the modem presidency simply required
reducing the staff and returning it to its original size and import would be to
ignore the pervasive environmental forces that have transformed presidential
leadership. To try to remove surgically the problems that attend large
organizations would only succeed in leaving the president an invalid, as self-
reliant as ever, yet incapacitated. 7
If the president wants to play a role in his own administration, he will need
to have staff resources. If he wants to play an effective role in the evolution of
constitutional law, he will need to have a sizable and capable White House
Counsel's Office.
147. Samuel Kernall, The Evolution of the White House Staff, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN?
185-237, 235 (John Chubb & Paul Peterson eds., 1989).
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